nono is a capability-based sandbox CLI and SDK family from nolabs-ai, the team behind Sigstore, that sandboxes an AI agent session at the kernel level and, distinctively, launches each delegated tool the agent calls under its own command sandbox with separate filesystem, network, and credential policy.
nono’s design point is that the agent’s session sandbox is not enough: each delegated tool gets its own sandbox, so git sees only the repo and git config, gh receives a token through a credential proxy scoped to selected API methods and paths, and the agent can widen none of it from inside its session.
What it is #
A Rust core with an installable CLI (curl script, Homebrew, Nix flake) plus Go, TypeScript, and Python SDKs over FFI, so the same policies can gate an agent harness or an application’s own LLM calls.
The session sandbox uses kernel primitives, and the broker wraps each controlled tool in a command policy of its own: the tool does not inherit the session’s broad grants, working-directory access, raw credential paths, or network access unless its profile says so.
Profiles can chain policies (git may call ssh under a chained policy while direct ssh from the agent stays denied) and route credentials through an L7-filtering proxy that enforces which API methods and paths a token may touch.
The project also advertises an immutable cryptographic audit chain and atomic rollback, and the registry namespace moved from always-further to nolabs-ai in the run-up to 1.0.
Apache-2.0, built by the Sigstore team, with an OpenSSF Best Practices badge and testimonials from staff and principal security engineers at Datadog and Okta on the README.
Status #
Fast-growing with no Hacker News help: 4,519 stars, 302 open issues and PRs, pushed 2026-11-14, created 2026-01-31; open issues and PRs at 304 as of 2026-11-15.
The release train is active and pre-1.0: v0.77.0 on 2026-09-11, v0.78.0 on 2026-09-16, v0.79.0 on 2026-09-30, v0.80.0 on 2026-10-13 (SHA-256 executable pinning in command policies, per-command aws_auth, command-level macOS keychain grants, and NEPs for a Windows enforcement backend and for invocation-scoped commands), and v0.81.0 on 2026-10-29, published with three new advisories (apply_seccomp() not working, an io_uring bypass of the af_unix pathname remediation, and a TLS-proxy crash that silently dropped the audit trail), with the README carrying an APIs-are-stabilizing note ahead of a 1.0. v0.82.0, the stable cut of the post-v0.81.0 train, followed on 2026-11-14: proxy audit events recorded live to the audit log, NEP-0010 session terminal recording shipped as a feature (approval elevation for AF_UNIX pathname sockets, unix-socket webhook transport and network approvals in nono proxy, approvals for allow_domain endpoints), the plain-HTTP forward path reaching parity with CONNECT (endpoint-rule enforcement and network approval), nono login and nono logout, a breaking CLI unification behind automatic enrollment, aws_auth route matching of AWS operations in endpoint_policy plus signing-profile selection by placeholder access key ID and request-host region derivation for wildcard upstreams, phantom_format for custom credentials, macOS process-exec scoped to the read set, and fixes for exact-file directory bypasses and the nono user’s home directory in Docker.
The project’s coordinated-disclosure record is now its own evidence base: fifteen advisories published between 2026-05-17 and 2026-10-29, re-checked at fifteen with nothing new as of 2026-11-13, including CVE-2026-47128 (a Linux sandbox escape through the user systemd D-Bus socket via systemd-run --user, disclosed in May), four high-severity bypasses (seccomp BPF filters missing legacy x86_64 syscall ABIs, io_uring bypassing the af_unix remediation, endpoint-policy enforcement wrongly authorizing paths, and the tool-sandbox shim falling through to nono’s own CLI), and hostname-normalization bypasses of host deny lists.
Hacker News never embraced it: four submissions between 2026-02-01 and 2026-02-04 drew 4, 1, and 2 points, an August resubmission drew 3, and the stars grew without a front-page thread, so the evidence base is the repo, the docs, the advisory record, and named enterprise testimonials rather than public debate.
Strengths #
- The finest-grained policy model in this category: per-tool command sandboxes with chained policies, rather than one blanket agent sandbox.
- The credential proxy answers key exfiltration per endpoint, which is stricter than vaults that inject a whole key.
- Credible security pedigree (the Sigstore team) plus an OpenSSF badge and a stated audit chain.
- SDK surface (Go, TypeScript, Python, Rust core) means the policies are callable from product code, not just a terminal.
Cautions #
- Pre-1.0 with an explicit API-change warning, and the namespace migration (
always-furthertonolabs-ai) is churn early adopters must handle. - Kernel-primitive isolation shares the host kernel; there is no VM or gVisor tier, so a kernel exploit is out of scope for this boundary, and the advisory record shows that ceiling has been reached in practice, most plainly by the D-Bus sandbox escape.
- No independent audit or adversarial write-up exists that I could find, the HN footprint is four near-zero threads, and the self-published advisory record (fifteen advisories in six months, four of them high severity) is disclosure evidence, not an audit.
- The marketing register on the README (“pioneered the zero-latency, zero-setup agent sandbox”, “copied by many”) is self-assessment, not evidence.
Pricing #
Free and open source under Apache-2.0, no paid tiers or hosted offering found as of 2026-10-07.
Compared to #
- OpenShell: NVIDIA’s runtime adds container and MicroVM boundaries and holds model keys at an inference proxy; nono stays at kernel primitives but scopes every tool’s credentials per endpoint, so choose OpenShell for VM strength, nono for delegation control.
- Drop: the namespace wrapper that keeps your host distribution with no per-tool brokering; simpler, and its threat model stops at the session boundary.
- Fence: the other OS-primitives CLI; Fence applies one policy per invocation, while nono brokers each delegated tool separately and proxies its credentials.
Bottom line #
Recommended for engineers whose main fear is the agent misusing the tools it delegates to, and who want per-tool, per-endpoint credential policy from a team with a security track record. Not for anyone who needs VM-grade boundaries today or an externally audited 1.0.
Changes #
- 2026-10-07 - Created from the entrant-resolution run, profiling the Sigstore team’s per-command sandbox broker with its credential proxy and the no-HN-growth finding.
- 2026-10-13 - Recorded v0.80.0 (2026-10-13, SHA-256 executable pinning in command policies, per-command aws_auth, command-level macOS keychain grants, and NEPs for a Windows enforcement backend and invocation-scoped commands), with counts refreshed (4,481 stars, pushed 2026-10-13).
- 2026-10-17 - Fixed the star-history picture block, whose light-scheme source and fallback carried the dark theme parameter (push of 2026-10-16 checked: no release since v0.80.0, nothing material).
- 2026-10-26 - Rotation re-verification: every cited URL re-fetched and alive (repository, docs site, the release record, the 4-point Show HN); v0.80.0 still the newest release with the post-release train on proxy fixes (407 for unauthenticated CONNECT, supervised connect ports, audit-path redaction), and open issues and PRs refreshed from 249 to 275.
- 2026-11-01 - Recorded v0.81.0 (2026-10-29, published with the apply_seccomp(), io_uring af_unix, and TLS-proxy audit-trail advisories) and the project’s coordinated-disclosure record (fifteen advisories between 2026-05-17 and 2026-10-29, including the CVE-2026-47128 D-Bus systemd-run sandbox escape and four high-severity bypasses), added to Status and Cautions with the advisory index added to References, and open issues and PRs at 289 with the repository pushed 2026-10-31.
- 2026-11-07 - The post-release train advanced through 2026-11-06 (endpoint-rule enforcement and network approval on plain-HTTP forward requests, nono login and logout commands, NEP 0010 for session terminal capture, exact-file directory bypass and Docker home-directory fixes), the advisory record re-checked at fifteen with nothing new, open issues and PRs at 300, and the repository pushed 2026-11-06; v0.81.0 remains the newest release.
- 2026-11-12 - Volatile refresh: the post-release train advanced through 2026-11-11 (a breaking CLI unification with automatic enrollment, credential-capture diagnostics, and allow-domain normalization), the advisory record re-checked at fifteen with nothing new, open issues and PRs at 299, and the repository pushed 2026-11-11; v0.81.0 remains the newest release.
- 2026-11-14 - Volatile refresh: the v0.82.0 tag cut on main on 2026-11-13 with no published GitHub release object as of 2026-11-14, so v0.81.0 remains the newest published release, and open issues and PRs at 302.
- 2026-11-15 - Recorded v0.82.0 (published 2026-11-14, the stable cut of the post-v0.81.0 train: live proxy audit events, NEP-0010 session terminal recording shipped, approval elevation for AF_UNIX sockets, unix-socket webhook approvals in
nono proxy, allow_domain approvals, plain-HTTP forward parity, login and logout, the breaking CLI unification, aws_auth endpoint_policy matching with signing-profile and region derivation, phantom_format custom credentials, macOS process-exec scoping, and the bypass fixes), with the advisory record re-checked at fifteen and open issues and PRs at 304.
See also #
- Sandboxing Feature Matrix - the category comparison this note joins
- OpenShell - the VM-backed policy runtime with the model-key proxy
- Fence - the invocation-level sibling using the same OS primitives
- Drop - the session-scoped namespace alternative
References #
https://github.com/nolabs-ai/nono - repository, mechanism, testimonials, OpenSSF badge, namespace-migration notice
https://docs.nono.sh/ - the CLI, Rust core, and Go/TypeScript/Python SDK surface
https://api.github.com/repos/nolabs-ai/nono - stars, open issues, creation and push dates as of 2026-10-07
https://api.github.com/repos/nolabs-ai/nono/releases - the v0.77.0 through v0.81.0 release record
https://github.com/nolabs-ai/nono/security/advisories - the coordinated-disclosure record: fifteen advisories with severities and dates, the critical source
https://hn.algolia.com/api/v1/items/46849615 - the 4-point Show HN of 2026-02-01, the largest of four near-zero threads